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1. Introduction
An unprecedented share of trade flows is constituted by intermediate input trade
in the new century. Yeats (2001) documents that in 1995 approximately thirty
percent of world manufacturing products trade is comprised by intermediate input
trade. In China, for instance, the value of intermediate imports imported by
manufacturing firms grew by 58.3% in 2001. This growth rate was even higher
than that in exports (47.7%). The prevalence of intermediate input trade is driven
by the benefits of global work sharing (Bergin et al., 2011) .
The efficiency gains could from a lower cost of the imported intermediates
(Antras et al., 2014), or arise from the technologies embodied in the intermediate
input (Fan et al., 2015).
Regardless of the benefits of intermediate input trade, uncertainties in foreign
markets prevent a large portion of firms from importing. Relative to domestic
markets, product price and quality of imports in remote foreign markets cannot
be precisely observed unless firms incur substantial exploration costs. These in-
formation frictions are treated as the reason for uncertainties in foreign markets.
Recent research documents the significant influence of information frictions on
trade flows (Allen, 2015; Dasgupta, et al., 2014; Steinwender, 2014; Rauch, 1999;
Portes and Rey, 2005; Chaney, 2014). Dasgupta, et al. (2014), for example, show
that information frictions in foreign markets magnify the effect of traditional grav-
ity terms on trade flows. Allen (2015) claims that half of the observed import price
dispersion across markets is due to information frictions rather than transporta-
tion cost. Steinwender (2014), Rauch (1999), Portes and Rey (2005) and Chaney
(2014) separately argue that a decrease in information acquiration costs leads to
a convergence in prices and trade volumes from different foreign countries after
controlling for traditional gravity variables.
In this paper, we attempt to unveil how learning from neighbors could allevi-
ate information frictions and increases firm-level propensity to import, and, at the
same time, increases initial imports from a given secure country. Similar to the
export decision, new importers acquire information about foreign markets through
2
learning from their importing neighbors. The learning from neighbor channel has
been referred to as local agglomeration and has been supported by a considerable
empirical evidence (Allen, 2015; Chaney, 2014; Krautheim, 2008; Rauch and Wat-
son, 2003; Cassey and Schmeiser, 2013; Clerides, et al., 1998; Kneller and Pisu,
2007; Aitken et al., 1997; Koenig et al., 2010). Chaney (2014), for instance, dis-
cusses the importance of social networks in determining trade flows. Krautheim
(2008) and Rauch and Watson (2003) show that information sharing among ex-
porters operating business in the same foreign countries reduces the trade cost and
uncertainties in foreign markets. This reduction further leads to export agglom-
eration. Clerides, et al. (1998); Kneller and Pisu (2007); Aitken et al. (1997) and
Koenig et al. (2010) find that the presence of multinational firms or local agglom-
eration of exporters, enhance the export propensity of local firms using data from
Colombia, UK, Mexico, and France, respectively. Unfortunately, while learning
to export has received substantial attentions, learning to import has rarely been
investigated.
In this work, we extend the model of Antras et al. (2014), which is based on
Eaton and Kortum (2002), along with Fernandes, et al. (2014) to study how firm-
level import decisions are affected by the importing performance of their neighbors.
In this model, we think that a new firm’s import price of any intermediate k in a
particular country j depends on three factors: the firm-level searching capability,
the productivity distribution of suppliers in sector k, and the wage level of sector k
in country j.1 The new firms know their own searching capability and the produc-
tivity distribution of suppliers in country j, but are uncertain about the wage level
of sector k in country j. An uninformed new importer speculates on the import
price of k in foreign markets and then imports the intermediate from the country
offering the lowest expected price, if they pay a sunk importing cost.2 Based on the
1 Firm specific familiarity of country j reduces its import cost of k from j. For instance, if
a firm is more familiar with country j, it is more likely to find a producer of high productivity,
who provides a lower price.
2 We do not intensionally discuss product quality in this paper due to the lack of quality
measures for imported materials. It is possible that a firm imports an intermediate input from
an expensive destination because of the high quality here. In order to ease this concern, we could
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information inferred from neighboring importers’ performance, the new importer
updates its prior speculation on the expected price of a given intermediate input
in a particular country. Since firm-level import performance is affected by the fir-
m’s own characteristics and the random search process, which is unobservable by
other firms, the observed import prices of a firm’s neighbors are inherently noisy
signals. Therefore, if the signal is revealed by more neighboring importers, it is
more reliable. Intuitively, when a signal is revealed by more neighboring firms, the
firm specific noises tend to average out to zero. As such, new importers can more
precisely infer the true state of foreign countries.
The model predicts that a firm’s import decision depends not only on the
number of neighboring importers, but also on the signal revealed by these nearby
importers. The average importing price or its growth play the role of a signal, and
the number of importing neighbors measures the precision of the observed signal.
On one hand, new importers can update their prior beliefs with more confidence, if
the observed signal is revealed by more neighbors. On the other hand, and different
from existing literature, an increase in the number of importers encourages entry,
this increase could potentially discourage entry if the revealed signal is negative
(a high average import price growth).
Finally, our model indicates that initial firm-level imports from markets with
a positive and precise signal tend to be larger than those from markets with either
negative signal or low precision. Intuitively, fewer uncertainties exist in markets
with more precise signals, and if the signal is positive, new firms could start from
a high volume of imports.
We find supporting evidence using a unique transaction-level trade dataset
covering the universe of Chinese importers over 2000-2006. Specifically, we find
that the entry rate and initial imports from any foreign market are both negatively
correlated with the signal, measured by the average growth rate of neighboring
firms’ importing price. The negative correlation is increasing in the number of
neighbors located in the same city. The learning effects on new importers’ entry
treat the above mentioned price as quality adjusted price.
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and initial imports are both quantitatively important. On average, the sample
mean growth rate of neighbors’ import price from a foreign country (12.71%), is
associated with a 11.49% decrease in import entry evaluated at the median entry
rate (1.48%) of the pooled sample. At the sample mean import price growth, a one
standard deviation decrease in the log number of neighboring firms import from
a country is associated with a 9% percent higher entry rate in the same country,
evaluated at the median entry rate.
Our work is closely related to Antras et al. (2014), in which firms optimally
search across a set of countries for the cheapest intermediate inputs. However, in
their framework, new importers only learn from their own search behavior. We fo-
cus on the channel of learning from importing neighbors. While our model shares
some similar features to the model in Fernandes, et al. (2014), the difference is
significant: when firms learn from neighbors about exporting, each foreign mar-
ket is independent. For a given set of information, a new firm could penetrate
multiple markets, once their expected profits are positive. In contrast, in the case
of learning to import, all foreign markets are interdependent as each firm often
import each intermediate from the most attractive countries, e.g. the countries
offering the cheapest price.3 As such, an importer only enters in one market for
one intermediate. Our work also distinguishes itself from Allen (2015), in which
producers search for buyers, but in our work the buyers search for producers.
To our best knowledge, this is the first work attempting to investigate import
agglomeration through the learning from neighbor channel. This paper contributes
to the regional agglomeration literature by adding explanations for importer ag-
glomeration from an information updating perspective. Agglomeration has found
to be beneficial to an economy by enhancing exporters’ productivity (Lin et al.,
2011; Yang et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2015) and increasing firms’ export propensity
(Kneller and Pisu, 2007; Greenaway and Kneller, 2008; Koenig et al., 2010) In this
paper, we find that import agglomeration also increase firm-level efficiency. As
3Similar to Antras et al. (2014), we find that most Chinese firms import a particular interme-
diate input from a single country. In particular, the median firm imports a single product from
an average of 1.00 country. The detailed statistics are reported in Table 1.
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such, our work demonstrates an additional mechanism through which agglomera-
tion benefits an economy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we present a model of
firm-level learning; section 3 describes the data; section 4 describes the empirical
results, and we conclude in section 5.
2. Model
2.1. Demand
Suppose there are J+1 countries in the world. Denote the home country by j = 0
and let j = 1...J represent the foreign countries. The representative consumer’s
preferences in country j over final goods takes the CES form:
U =
(∫
ω∈Ωj
q(ω)(σ−1)/σ
)σ/(σ−1)
, (1)
where Ωj is the set of all final goods available to consumers in country j, and σ
denotes the elasticity of substitution between any two products. The preferences
lead to the following demand for final good ω in country j:
qj(ω) = Ajpj(ω)
−σ, (2)
where pj(ω) is the price of final good ω. Aj = YjP
σ−1
j is the residual demand of ω
in country j, and Yj and Pj denote the income and price index of country j. To
simplify notations in the next section, we define Bj and B as follows:
Bj =
1
σ
(
σ
1− σ
)(1−σ)
Ajτ
−σ
j . (3)
B =
∑
j∈Jex(ϕ,Bw)
Bj, (4)
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where Jex(ϕ,Bw) is the set of countries to which a firm in the home country with
productivity ϕ exports. The superscript ex indicates export. τj is the ice-berg
transportation cost between the home country and country j. Note τj = 1 if
j = 0, and otherwise τj > 1. Bj is the transportation cost adjusted residual
demand in country j, which is proportional to the residual demand in country j.
Bw = (B0, B1, B2, ..., BJ) is a vector contains every country’s transportation cost
adjusted residual demand, and B is the aggregate adjusted residual demand of
countries in this firm’s exporting set.
2.2. Supply
Following Antras et al. (2014), we assume that firms need to assemble a series of
intermediates, {k}mk=1, to produce the final products. Each intermediate can be
purchased domestically or imported from foreign countries. If a firm decides to
import a particular intermediate from foreign countries, it needs to decide from
which country it will import. Intermediates are assumed to be imperfectly substi-
tutable with each other, with a constant and symmetric elasticity of substitution
equal to ρ. The unit assembling cost for a firm located in home country with
productivity ϕ is given by:
c(ϕ) =
1
ϕ
(
m∑
r=1
(
τj(k)pikj(k)
)1−ρ) 11−ρ
, (5)
where j(k) denotes the country from which intermediate k is imported, and pikj(k)
is the f.o.b import price of intermediate k from country j(k).
From equation (5) the unit assembly cost is positively correlated with the im-
port price of each required intermediate. Firm i in the home country aims to
purchase each intermediate from the cheapest destination. To import an interme-
diate k, each firm has to pay a sunk entry cost. We assume that before importing,
a firm cannot observe the price of intermediate k in country j because of a lack
of information. Furthermore, we assume the f.o.b price of product k in country j
faced by firm i depends on several factors as follows
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pikj = aikjωkjζikj, (6)
Suppliers in country j are heterogeneous in their productivity, and when im-
porting from country j, firm i randomly meets a supplier. Let aikj represent the
inverse productivity (or the marginal cost in terms of labor) of the supplier pro-
ducing intermediate k in country j met by firm i, which is randomly distributed
and ωkj is the wage level in the sector producing intermediate k in country j. This
wage captures the country j’s relative competitiveness in producing intermediate
k. This is a country-product specific constant, which is assumed to be unknown
to firm i before it imports k from j.4 Instead, firm i holds a prior belief about the
distribution of the wages in sector k of country j, which will be updated based
on the information revealed by neighboring importers. The variable ζikj denotes
the inverse searching capability of firm i for intermediate k in country j. A higher
firm-product-country specific searching ability (a lower ζikj) increases the likeli-
hood that the importer meets a higher productivity producer, which leads to a
lower expected import price.5
Searching capability is assumed to depend on two terms: an observable firm-
country specific component, vij, which captures the firm’s familiarity with country
j (j 6= 0), and an unobservable firm-country-product random component, εikj,
4Implicitly, we assume that the technology competitiveness of country j in producing k is
unknown to potential new importers, as the wage level ωkj depends on the country specific
competitiveness. We argue that all our results still hold if we assume the wage level ωkj is known
by potential new importers, but the distribution of the inverse productivity, aikj , is unknown.
In this way, new importers update their beliefs on the distribution of aikj .
5We note that in our model a new importer is not really searching in a foreign market but
randomly meets a supplier of a particular intermediate. We use the phrase “searching capability”
to denote firm specific factors that affect the probability of meeting a more productive supplier
in a given market.
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which can be interpreted as the searching luck:6
ln ζikj = −lnvij − lnεikj (7)
Equation (7) implies that if a firm is more familiar with a country j, a higher vij,
and have a better searching luck, a higher εikj, it will have a lower ζikj. According
to equation (6), this firm is more likely to obtain a cheaper import price.
In sum, a country with a lower wage level in the intermediate sector k, and
more familiar to firm i, will be more attractive to firm i.
Taking logs on both sides of equation (6), we have
ln pikj = ln aikj + lnωkj − lnvij − ln εikj. (8)
Assume ln aikj ∼ N(0, V akj), lnωkj ∼ N(µωkj, V ωkj), and ln εikj follows a Fre´chet dis-
tribution. Note that the degree of familiarity, lnvij, is assumed to be a constant,
which measures firm i’s importing advantage from country j, while the searching
luck, εikj, is assumed to be random. Firms draw their luck when they start im-
porting. The distribution of lnωkj represents firm i’s prior belief about the log
wage in country j for product k before importing. After importing, there is no
uncertainty associated with lnωkj, and the distribution is reduced to a constant.
The firm-level expected profit can be written as:
Epii = BEc(ϕ)
1−σ −
∑
k
Iikfk
= Bϕσ−1i E
[∑
k
(
τj(k)pikj(k)
)1−ρ] 1−σ1−ρ −∑
k
Iikfk (9)
where fk is the sunk entry cost into a particular source country j for import k, and
6Familiarity vij could be revealed by a firm’s historic importing (exporting) experience from
(to) country j: more importing (exporting) experience from (to) country j indicates a greater
familiarity vij , which is assumed to be observable by other firms. In contrast, firms draw their
searching luck individually and this is unobservable by other firms.
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Iik is an indicator function, which takes the value 1 if firm i imports intermediate
input k from a foreign country and 0 otherwise. Iik also represents the firm-product
specific import probability. The entry cost fk for all k is assumed to be sufficiently
large, and paid before importing. As such, no firm will pay multiple entry costs,
say n · fk, to penetrate into n source countries and importing from the cheapest
destinations.7 Note that the sunk entry cost is assumed to be 0 if firm i purchases
k from the domestic market.8 B is the aggregate adjusted residual demand defined
in equation (4). Equation (9) indicates that importing intermediate input k from
the cheapest source destination comes with an additional fixed cost, fk, but lowers
the marginal production cost, c(ϕ). The marginal benefit is larger for firms with
higher productivity, ϕ, and facing a larger gap between the minimum importing
price and domestic purchasing price.9 As such, the firm-level import decision is
depicted by the firm-level productivity, expected import prices, and the domestic
price: Iik = I(ϕi,min
j 6=0
τjEpikj, pik0), with
∂Iik
∂ϕi
≥ 0, ∂Iik
∂(min
j 6=0
τjEpikj)
≤ 0, and ∂Iik
∂pik0
≥ 0 (10)
where min
j 6=0
τjEpikj denotes the minimum expected importing price from foreign
countries. Inequalities in (10) imply that the firm-level import probability is non-
decreasing in firm-level productivity, and the price in the domestic country, while
it is non-increasing in the minimum expected import price from foreign countries.
7When the sunk entry cost, fk, is sufficiently large, a potential importer has to decide one
source country, in which k has the lowest expected import price, to import from. In contrast, if
fk is small, a firm can pay multiple entry costs, and decide which country to import from after
observing the actual import prices.
8For simplicity, we assume an identical fixed importing cost of fk from any foreign country
j(k). In this way, if a firm decides to import k, it only needs to compare the import price in
different countries without considering the difference in entry cost. In the empirical part, we
will control for product-country fixed effects to eliminate the impact of fixed import costs on
firm-level import decisions.
9Intuitively, a more productive firm has larger sales, and hence, the same unit production cost
reduction brings larger benefits. At the meanwhile, when the difference between the cheapest
importing and domestic prices is larger (minj τjpikj < pik0), importing leads to a larger unit
production cost reduction.
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These inequalities demonstrate that more productive firms are more likely to im-
port k from foreign countries as the benefits of lowering the marginal cost is larger;
firms with a stronger searching capability in foreign countries also more likely to
import, as they are more likely to obtain a cheaper import price; firms with a
stronger searching capability in the domestic country are less likely to import as
the domestic purchasing price is already low.
Based on the import decision function I(ϕi,min
j 6=0
τjEpikj, pik0), the productivity
threshold for importing k can be presented as: ϕ¯i = ϕ(min
j 6=0
τjEpikj, pik0), with
ϕ¯i =∞ if min
j 6=0
τjEpikj ≥ pik0, and ∂ϕ¯i
∂(min
j 6=0
Epikj)
≤ 0, ∂ϕ¯i
∂pik0
≥ 0 (11)
The inequalities in (11) demonstrate first that if the minimum expected import
price is greater than the domestic purchase price, no firm will import; second, the
import productivity threshold is decreasing in the minimum expected import price.
Third, the import productivity threshold is increasing in the domestic price.
In what follows, we focus our discussion on the optimal import destination
decision of firms, with ϕi > ϕ¯i.
2.3. Updating Prior Beliefs
Consider firm i before it imports intermediate k from country j (j 6= 0) and before
it observes any signals revealed by pioneer importers. It concludes its expected
f.o.b. import price in country j takes the following form
E(pikj) =
1
vijεikj
exp(µkj +
Vkj
2
), (12)
where Vkj = V
a
kj + V
ω
kj. Equation (12) implies that the expected price facing firm
i in country j decreases in the variation of aikj and ωkj. In another words, if the
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suppliers’ productivity distribution is less dispersed in country j for sector k,10 and
the prior distribution of country j’s wage level in this sector is less volatile, the
expected price is smaller. The intuition is that the more volatile of the wage and
productivity distribution in sector k of country j, the more likely new importers
receive a high import price, and the expected import price is higher.
Suppose firm i located in a region, where nkj,t−1 firms importing intermediate
k from country j at period t − 1. We assume that firm i could observe a signal,
unbkj,t−1, revealed by nearby firms importing k from country j. Making use of the
revealed information, firm i updates its prior belief about the distribution of lnωkj,
(µωkj, V
ω
kj). As such, this firm could improve the precision of the signal it receives
regarding the price of k in country j. Based on the number of neighbors importing
intermediate k from country j, and their average import price, a new firm infers
the log price of k in country j as µnbkj,t−1 = ln pkj,t−1.
Based on unbkj,t−1, the signal inferred from neighbors, firm i updates its prior, in
the way proposed by DeGroot (2004). The posterior of log wage level is normally
distributed with the following mean11:
µpostkjt = λtµ
nb
kj,t−1 + (1− λt)µkj, (13)
where λt is the weight on µ
nb
kj,t−1 when firm i updates its prior belief. The weight
depends on the precision of the signal, and has the following form:
λt =
nkj,t−1V ωkj
nkj,t−1V ωkj + V
a
kj
. (14)
Accordingly, the posterior variance of lnωkj given nkj,t−1 and µnbkj,t−1, can be written
10Notice that the variance of productivity, aikj , and inverse productivity,
1
aikj
, is positive corre-
lated. A more dispersed productivity distribution implies a more dispersed inverse productivity
distribution.
11The detailed update process is in the Appendix.
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as
V ω,postkjt =
V akjV
ω
kj
nkj,t−1V ωkj + V
a
kj
=
(
1
V ωkj
+
nkj,t−1
V akj
)−1
. (15)
Differentiating λt w.r.t. nkj,t−1 yields the following relationship between the weight
and the precision of the signal:
∂λt
∂nkj,t−1
=
V ωkjV
a
kj
nkj,t−1V ωkj + V
a
kj
> 0. (16)
Inequality (16) implies that if more neighbors import k from country j in the
previous period, when updating their prior beliefs, new importers put a larger
weight on the signal inferred from their neighbors, µnbkj,t−1. This is because more
precise signals are more reliable.
Several features of equation (14) and (15) worth addressing here: first, the
posterior’s mean, µpostkj,t , is decreasing in the signal, µ
nb
kj,t−1. As such, a good signal,
in terms of a low µnbkj,t−1, encourages importing. Second, µ
post
kj,t relies on the weight,
λt. Conditioning on a good signal, the posterior mean is decreasing in the weight,
λt. From inequality (16), the weight is increasing in the number of importers,
nkj,t−1, which captures the precision of the signal. Therefore, conditioning on a
good signal, µpostkj,t is decreasing in the number of importers. Third, the weight, λt
also depends on the dispersion of productivity, which is decreasing in the dispersion
of the productivity distribution. As such, all other things equal, the weight is
smaller in sectors with a higher degree of productivity heterogeneity. Fourth, the
posterior variance, V ω,postkj,t , is decreasing in the number of importing neighbors,
nkj,t−1. The intuition is that the precision of the signal is increasing in the number
of importing neighbors. The number of importing neighbors, nkj,t−1 plays two
roles in the updating process: on the one hand, it lowers the posterior mean
(conditioning on a good signal); and on the other hand, it decreases uncertainty
by decreasing the posterior variance, V ω,postkj,t .
12
12Note that the number of neighboring importers might also decrease the uncertainty in foreign
markets by reducing the entry cost (e.g. Krautheim, 2008). The reduction in uncertainties does
not rely on any signal and hence we do not emphasize this channel in our model. Whereas, we
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Before we move to the optimal firm-level import decision, let us briefly out-
line the equilibrium features of this model. Each final product producer draws a
productivity-level, ϕ, from a particular distribution g(ϕ). Firms assemble a series
intermediate inputs to make the final products, and hence, the firm-level marginal
production cost is jointly determined by its productivity ϕ and where its interme-
diate inputs are imported from. Importing any intermediate k from a particular
foreign country j requires a sufficiently large sunk cost, fk. As such, firms with a
low productivity-level, i.e. ϕi < ϕ¯i(min
j 6=0
τjEpikj, pik0), will not import. For firms
with a sufficiently high productivity, i.e. ϕi > ϕ¯i(min
j 6=0
τjEpikj, pik0), they pay a
sunk import cost fk to import intermediate k from the cheapest foreign country
based on their knowledge. The beliefs of new importers about the expected im-
port price Epikj is affected by their neighboring importers. New importers update
the precision of their inference or the expected import price Epikj based on the
signal revealed by their neighboring importers. Countries revealing good signals
will attract more new importers, but not all. This is because that the firm-level
searching capability, 1
ζikj
, varies across markets. As such, firm i could still choose
to import k from country j even if its neighboring importers reveal good signal-
s from country j′, if it is better at searching in country j, has a high degree of
familiarity with country j, or has a good luck in country j.
In equilibrium: (1). More productive firms are engaged in importing; (2).
Firms make their import sourcing decision based on their prior knowledge and
signals they observe; (3). Conditional on importing, each firm imports a given
intermediate k from one foreign country because of the costly entry cost, fk; (4).
Countries that reveal good signals in period t attract more importers in period t+1
(that further attract more new importers in subsequent periods); (5). Countries
that reveal poor signals will also attract entrants which have sufficiently high
searching capability in these countries.
will control the effect of this channel in our empirical exercises.
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2.4. Firms’ Importing Country Decision
Based on the revealed signal and its own prior belief, and conditioning on ϕi > ϕ¯i,
firm i imports intermediate k from the foreign country offering the lowest expected
price.13 Denote Epik = {Epik1, ..., EpikJ} as firm i’s vector of expected prices for
intermediate k in all countries. Firm i imports k from country j if
Epikjτj < Epikj′τj′ ,∀j′ 6= j (17)
Conditional on importing, the probability of firm’s importing intermediate k
from a particular foreign country j is given by14:
Pikj = Pr (ln [Epikjτj] < ln[Epik1]) · ...Pr (ln [EpikJτjt] < ln[EpikJτJt])
=
exp
[
−µpostkjt −
V postkjt
2
− lnτjt − lnvij
]
∑r=J
r=0 exp
[
−µpostkrt − V
post
krt
2
− lnτrt − lnvir
] (18)
where V postkjt = V
a
kj + V
ω,
kjt
post. From equation (18), the probability a firm imports
intermediate k from country j is determined by the posterior mean, µpostkjt , and the
posterior variance,
V postjt
2
. Both variables are affected by the signal, µnbkj,t−1, and
its precision, nkj,t−1, the number of neighboring firms importing k from country
j. As such, the conditional import probability of k from country j, Pikj, depends
crucially on the signal and its precision. We have the following inequalities:15
13Recall that, if a firm has imported k from j last period, there would be no uncertainty
associated with pikj . Therefore, all the following analysis is for new importers.
14Recall that searching luck, εikj , is a random draw from a Fre´chet distribution, and hence we
have a closed form solution for importing probability
15We argue that the unconditional import probability of k from a particular foreign country
j, P ∗ikj = Pikj · Iik also decreases in the signal µnbkj,t−1, and increases in nkj,t−1 if µnbkj,t−1 < µkj .
The reason is that according to inequalities (10), the import probability Iik is decreasing in the
minimum import price from foreign countries, and the minimum import price is increasing in
the signal µnbkj,t−1.
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∂Pikj
∂µnbkj,t−1
< 0 (19)
∂Pikj
∂nkj,t−1
> 0, if µnbkj,t−1 < µkj (20)
Inequality (19) implies that a good signal from a particular market, a lower
µnbkj,t−1, increases the likelihood a new importer will import from this market. In-
equality (20) demonstrates that conditioning on a good signal, more precise signals
about a given product-market pair, a higher nkj,t−1, will also increase the proba-
bility that a new importer starts importing from this market.16 Formally we have
the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (Entry) The probability that a firm start importing intermediate k
from a particular country j is decreasing in the signal about the market’s expected
price inferred from neighbors’ import performance, and more so if the signal is
revealed by more neighbors.
2.4.1. Initial Imports
Our model also generates predictions about new importers’ initial imports from a
new market. Recent literature shows that new exporters often start selling small
quantities in new markets (Eaton et al., 2008; Fernandes, et al., 2014). Similarly,
Dasgupta, et al. (2014) also demonstrate that new importers start importing small
quantities due to information frictions. One commonly accepted explanation is
that uncertainties about the foreign markets induce firms to “start small” to test
a new market (Rauch and Watson, 2003).
In this section, we investigate if the initial firm-level imports are related to the
16The number of importers located in the neighborhood, nkj , has two impacts on the import
likelihood of firm i from country j: on the one hand, it decrease the uncertainty in country j,
smaller V ′kj , which will increase firm i’s import probability from country j; on the other hand,
it affects the precision of the signal. This has uncertain impact on firm i’s import likelihood
from country j. If there is a good signal, the second influence increases the likelihood that new
importers import from this country.
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strength and the precision of the signals from neighboring importers. There are two
reasons why initial firm-level imports could depend on the expected import price,
rather than the actual import price. First, firms’ production schemes have been
set before they observe the importing prices of every intermediate (e.g. Dasgupta,
et al., 2014), and hence, their initial import quantities rely on their expected
importing prices. Second, adjusting output levels is often costly. A firm could still
import large quantities when facing high actual import prices, if it believes that it
met a low productivity (a high aikj) intermediate supplier, but the average wage
level ωkj is low. As such, they are able to meet a high productivity supplier in the
same country next period, and do not need to adjust its production scheme.
The firm-level total cost is proportional to the profit. From the expected profit
function defined in equation (9), the firm-level expected profit (before considering
all fixed import costs) and expected total cost are as follows:
Epi(ϕ) = BEc(ϕ)1−σ. (21)
ECt = (σ − 1)Epi(ϕ). (22)
Equations (21) and (22) jointly imply that a decrease in the expected unit
assembly cost, Ec(ϕ), increases the expected total cost, ECt. The intuition is that
when the expected unit assembly cost decreases, a firm reaches a higher production
efficiency, and is willing to produce more. The increase in production requires more
inputs and hence increases total costs. We rewrite the expected unit assembly cost
as:17
17Strictly speaking, the expected unit assembly cost is:
Ec(ϕ) = 1ϕE
(∑
r 6=k(τj(r)pirj(r))
1−ρ + (τjpikj)1−ρ
) 1
1−ρ
. In order to get the formula (23), suppose
that each intermediate input k contains a series of sub-intermediates km, where m = 1, ....M . 1
unit intermediate k is produced by combining these sub-intermediates: 1M (k1 + ... + kM ). The
price of each sub-intermediate km is pikmj , which follows the same distribution as pikj . As such,
pikj =
1
M
∑M
m=1 pikmj ≈ Epikj , and after making the optimal import decision, the firm-level
expected unit assembly cost is given by formula (23).
17
Ec(ϕ) =
1
ϕ
(∑
r 6=k
(τj(r)Epirj(r))
1−ρ + (τjEpikj)1−ρ
) 1
1−ρ
(23)
It is easy to verify that ∂Ec(ϕ)
∂τjEpikj
> 0. The cost share of intermediate k imported
from country j is:
skj =
(τjEpikj)
1−ρ∑m
r=1(τrEpirj(r))
1−ρ . (24)
The firm-level initial import volumes of intermediate k from country j can be
written as:
impkj =
ECt · skj
τjEpikj
=
(σ − 1)BEc(ϕ)1−σskj
τjEpikj
(25)
It is easy to show that
∂impkj
∂(τjEpikj)
< 0. The details are in the Appendix. This implies
that the initial firm-level imports are decreasing in the expected price of product
k in country j. From equations (12), (13) and (15), we know that the expected
price is increasing in the signal, µnbkj,t−1, and conditioning on a good signal, a lower
µnbkj,t−1, it is decreasing in the precision of the signal, nkj,t−1.
18 As such, we have
the following proposition:
Proposition 2. (Initial Imports) The initial volumes of k imported by a firm from
country j is decreasing in the signal about the market’s expected price inferred
from neighbors’ import performance, and more so if the signal is revealed by more
neighbors.
18In particular, from equation (8) the expected price is increasing in the posterior mean, µpostkj
and variance, V ω,postkjt , respectively. Equations (9) to (11) imply that the posterior mean and
variance are both decreasing in the signal, a lower µnbkj,t−1. Furthermore, conditioning on a good
signal, the posterior mean and variance are decreasing in the precision of the signal, nkj,t−1.
As such, the expected price is decreasing in the signal and conditional on a good signal it is
decreasing in the precision of the signal.
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3. Data
The main dataset we use in the empirical analysis covers the annual import and
export transactions of all Chinese firms during the 2000-2006 period. The product-
level transaction data are obtained from China’s General Administration of Cus-
toms (GAC). The dataset contains information of product at the 8-digit of the
Harmonization System Code (HS code) level for each trading firm, including im-
port/export price, quantity value export destinations and import source countries
(over 200 source and destination countries). In addition, this dataset also provides
information on the ownership type, trade regime of each trading firm, as well as
the city where each trading firm is located. The location information is crucial
for us to construct variables to estimate the local learning effect. This will be
discussed further in the next section. The empirical analysis focuses on learning
about the import price in foreign countries.
The cross-region variation in the prevalence of neighboring importers provides
identification for the learning effect. Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the geograph-
ical distribution of the number of firms importing from the U.S., and the rate of
entry into the U.S. market, respectively. These figures exhibit strong cross-regional
variation in the number of importers and the market entry rate.
[Figure 1 is to be here]
[Figure 2 is to be here]
3.1. Basic Patterns
Our empirical analysis relies critically on firms’ importing activities. Table 1 re-
ports statistics about the number of countries each product is imported from, and
the number of products imported from each country. All statistics are at the
firm-level.
[Table 1 is to be here]
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The left panel of Table 1 presents statistics on the firm-level number of imported
products per country. The average of the firm-level mean is 4.34 products imported
per country, and the 95th percentile of the firm-level mean is 15.67. The statistics
for the whole 2000-2006 period are reported first, followed by the statistics for each
year between 2000-2006. The right panel of Table 1 presents the same firm-level
statistics for the number of countries from which a firm imports a particular HS8
product. Consistent with our model, firms seldom import the same product from
multiple countries, although they tend to import multiple products per country.
In right panel, almost every statistic reported in this table is close to one. The
median firm imports a single product from an average of 1 country. The last column
shows that on average, around 85% firms import a single product from only one
country. Similar to Antras et al. (2014), in the empirical exercise we exclude the
observations where a product is imported from more than one country.
This analysis focuses primarily on the geographic and sectoral distributions of
the new trade linkages established by Chinese importers over the 2000-2006 period.
The empirical patterns are described in Table 2. The import entry rates exhibit
destination, province, and sector diversifications. Panel A shows the top 5 desti-
nations with the highest import entry rate. Japan is the destination representing
6.34% of overall import entry of Chinese firms, followed by USA, Germany, Hong
Kong and Korea. Panel B reports the top 5 provinces of highest import entry rates.
New imports are more concentrated in Guangdong (6.59%), and Shanghai(6.18%),
followed by Jiangsu, Beijing, Liaoning. Panel C demonstrates a sectoral concen-
tration of import entry. The sector of “Nuclear reactors and machinery, et al.”
accounts for the highest import entry probability, 4.24% over the period in com-
parison with 4.21% for “Electric machinery, et al” and 2.25% for “Plastics and
articles thereof”.
[Table 2 is to be here]
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4. Empirical Evidence
In this section we examine the model’s predictions using the firm-product-level
import data from China.
4.1. Entry
In order to examine Proposition 1 about new importers’ entry decisions into foreign
markets, we define the dependent variable of the regression as follows:
Entryicjkt =
{
1 if xicjk,t−1 = 0, xicjkt > 0
0 if xicjk,t−1 = 0, xicjkt > 0
(26)
where Entryicjkt = 1 if firm i located in city c was not importing intermediate k
from country j before year t in the sample, but started importing k from country
j in t. xicjkt denotes firm i’s import volumes of product k from country j.
Notice first that entry is defined at firm-product-source level, and hence import
source switching is treated as a new entry. For instance, if firm i imports interme-
diate k from country j′ in t−1 and switches to import the same intermediate from
country j in t, Entryicjkt = 1. The reason we treat importing source switches as
new entries is that switching firms do not observe the import price of a particular
product in a new market. As such, they benefit from their neighbors’ information
spillovers as other new importers.19 Second, since we cannot observe which firms
are the potential importers for a given intermediate, we only investigate how new
importers make their import source decisions. As such, the analysis focuses on
firms which import at least once during the sample period.
One difficulty in the empirical exercise is finding a measure of the signal in-
ferred from neighbors, that is, µnbkj,t−1 in the model. Using the average import price
19We conduct a robustness check to investigate whether switching firms exhibit different learn-
ing capability from new entrants. The results are in Table 5.
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of k from country j revealed by neighbors to proxy the price signal could induce
bias. The reason is that the firm specific searching capability is not completely
observable. Therefore, an observed low import price of k in country j might re-
veal neighboring importers’ strong searching capability in country j. In addition,
the import price might reveal unobserved product characteristics, such as product
quality. It is unclear whether a high import price implies a good or bad signal.
Similar to Fernandes and Tang (2014), we use the average growth rate of existing
firms’ import price of k in country j from city c between year t − 1 and t as the
proxy for µnbkj,t−1. This measure isolates the influence of time-invariant neighbors’
heterogeneous searching efficiency and country-product unobservable characteris-
tics on the signal.20 Specifically, the neighbors’ average import price growth rate
is defined as:
∆ln(pcjkt) =
1
ncjk,t−1
∑
i∈Ncjk,t−1
[ln(picjkt − lnpicjk,t−1)], (27)
where Ncjk,t−1 is the set of existing firms that import product k from j in city c in
both year t− 1 and t, and ncjk,t−1 is the number of importers in the set. Equation
(27) implies that neither new entrants in year t or one time importers in year
t− 1 are included. In the baseline regressions, we also control for a wide range of
fixed effects, such as city-country fixed effects, product-country fixed effects, and
firm-year fixed effects to isolate the impact of time trends and other unobservable
factors on firm-level import decisions.21
In order to verify that ∆ln(pcjkt) is a convincing choice of proxy for the signal,
we plot the average (log) import price from country m by firms located in region c
in year t against the corresponding value in year t− 1, after pinning down region-
destination fixed effects. Figure 3 exhibits a strongly positive correlation between
20We note that price increase might indicate quality increase. We control for country-product-
year fixed effect to alleviate this concern.
21Tan et al. (2015)document the fact that more than 50% firms engaging in international
trade are multi-product firms.The large number of multi-product importers provides a within-
firm variation in import performance, when firm-year fixed effect are controlled for.
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these two values. This suggests that import prices at the source and city-source
level are positively correlated over time. Therefore, the import price in a market
today reveals information about the import price in the same market tomorrow.
Therefore, learning is profitable in the sense that import price pattern tends to be
persistent.
[Figure 3 is to be here]
4.1.1. The Impact of Signals on the Firm-level Decision to Start Im-
porting
Specifically, we estimate the following specification:
Pr(Entryicjkt) = α + β1[ln(ncjk,t−1)∆ln(pcjkt)] + β2∆ln(pcjkt)
+ β3ln(ncjk,t−1) + Z ′γ + εicjkt, (28)
where Entryicjkt is defined in equation (26). The independent variables contain
the proxy for the signal, ∆ln(pcjkt); the log number of neighbors in city c importing
k from country j in the last year, and other controls including GDP per capita in
the source countries,22 and a number of fixed effects. The results are reported in
Table 3.
[Table 3 is to be here]
The results in column 1 to 4 of Table 3 are obtained by adding more controls
in each column. The results in column 4 indicate that the probability a firm starts
importing product k from country j in year t is positively related with the number
of neighbors importing k from j in year t− 1, and negatively related to the signal
revealed by these neighbors. The entry decision depends on the signal more if
the signal is revealed by more neighbors. More specifically, a coefficient of 0.217
22GDP per capita captures the average wage level in a particular country across all sectors.
Richer country usually have higher wage level.
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on ln(ncjk,t−1) in column 4 implies that a one standard deviation increase in the
log number of neighbors importing from country j raises the entry probability by
2.65 percentage point. However, a coefficient of -0.083 on ∆ln(pcjkt) in column
4 suggests that at the sample mean of the observed import price growth from
neighbors (12.70%) is associated with a 0.17 percentage point decrease in the
probability of entry into the market.23 This number seems small, but relative to
the median entry rate in a country, which is 1.48%, a 12.70% higher growth rate
in import price from a particular country is associated with a 11.49% decrease in
the import entry rate. In addition, the coefficient of −0.086 on the interaction
term, ln(ncjk,t−1)∆ln(pcjkt), indicates that an increase in the import price growth
among neighboring firms equal to the sample mean (12.70%), is associated with a
decrease in the entry probability by 0.13 percentage points when the log number
of neighbors revealing the signal increases by one standard deviation (that is,
1.37, or about 3.9 firms). This roughly explains a 9% decrease in the entry rate
evaluated at the median entry rate in the sample. All the results are consistent
with Proposition 1.
4.1.2. Different Nature of Signals
We are interested in understanding how the firm-level probability to start im-
porting is related to: (1) neighboring firms which import different products from
the same country (destination-specific learning); (2) neighboring firms which im-
port the same product from different countries (product-specific learning); (3)
neighboring firms which import different products from different countries (gener-
al learning).
We define the number of neighboring firms and signals in different ways: the
first is country-specific agglomeration, ln(ncj(−k),t−1), and signals ∆ln(pcj(−k),t).
These two variables denote the number of neighboring firms which import different
products from the same country and the average price growth of these firms. The
23This figure is calculated following Koenig et al., (2010): −0.083 × ln(1.127) × 0.22 × (1 −
0.22)× 100, where 0.22 is the average probability of importing in our sample.
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second is product-specific agglomeration ln(nc(−j)k,t−1) and signals ∆ln(pc(−j)k,t),
which capture the number of neighboring firms importing the same product from
different countries and their average price growth. The last is the general agglom-
eration, ln(nc(−j)(−k),t−1), and signals ∆(pc(−j)(−k),t). When calculating these two
variables, we do not take product and country into account.
All the results are reported in Table 4. Columns 1-3 report the influence of the
country-specific, product-specific and general agglomeration variables and signals
on firm-level decisions to start importing, respectively.
[Table 4 is to be here]
The results in Table 4 demonstrate that an increase in the number of nearby
importers increases the probability that a firm starts importing no matter how how
specific the agglomeration variable is constructed. In contrast, signals from these
neighboring importers has an insignificant effect on firm-level decisions to start
importing. One interpretation is that the price signals from different products or
in various countries do not effectively reveal the price information for a particular
product in an unfamiliar country. As such, we find that signal encourages entry into
importing when it is highly specific, e.g. destination-product specific. However,
the increase in the number of neighboring importers alone always encourages firms
to start importing.
4.1.3. Heterogeneous Type of New Importers
The decision to start importing for different type of firms may rely differently on
the number of neighboring importers and the revealed signal. For instance, the
signal for heterogeneous intermediate input importers is expected to be more useful
relative to that for homogeneous intermediates. The reason is that on average the
price dispersion for homogeneous products is smaller than that for heterogeneous
products. As such, the price signal is more useful for heterogeneous intermediate
input importers. We examine the learning effect for different types of firms, and
report the results in Table 5.
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[Table 5 is to be here]
First, Column 1 and Column 2 report our findings for firm-level decisions to
start importing for a given product from a particular country across both large
and small importers.24 We find that the likelihood of importing is increasing in the
number of neighboring firms importing the same product from the same country in
the previous year for both types of firms. In contrast, only small firms are induced
to import by the signal, and the interaction is only statistically significant for small
firms. One possible explanation is that large firms have other channels to reduce
uncertainties in sourcing countries, such as through incurring expensive exploration
costs which are not affordable to small firms (e.g. Antras et al., 2014). Therefore,
large firms do not rely on signals to make their decisions to start importing as
much as small firms.
Second, Column 3 and Column 4 show the fact that while the likelihood of
starting to import for heterogeneous product importers increases in the number of
neighboring importers and deceases in the signal, the import probability for homo-
geneous product importers only increases in the number of neighboring importers.
This result is consistent with our intuition that the signal is more useful for het-
erogenous product importers relative to that for homogeneous product importers
due to the greater price dispersion among heterogeneous products.25
Third, Column 5 and Column 6 report the results for new importers and switch-
ers. The new importers are defined as firms who did not import product k from
any country j in t − 1, and start importing k since t. On contrast, switchers are
importers who imported product k from j′ 6= j in year t− 1, but switch to import
the same product from j in year t. The results show that the number of neighbor-
ing importers and the revealed signals have very similar impact on new entrants
24 We classify firms into large and small categories according to their total import value in the
year they start importing.
25 Homogeneous products are more standardized and often have a reference price. These
futures make homogeneous intermediate input easy to contract. In contrast, heterogeneous
products have larger dispersions in their quality, price, etc, which make them more uncertain for
new importers.
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and switchers.
Last, Column 7-9 show the results for new importers with different ownership-
types, state-owned firms (SOEs), private firms and foreign-invested firms (FIEs).
The results demonstrate that for firms with different ownership-types, the likeli-
hood that they start importing is positively affected by the number of neighbors
importing the same product from the same country in the previous year, and neg-
atively related to the revealed signal. Furthermore, the signal has larger influence
on the probability of importing among SOEs and private firms, when it is revealed
by more neighbors. This effect is significant for FIEs only at the 90% confidence
level. One possible explanation is that FIEs have better connection with foreign
countries, and hence they can better identify the precision of the signal.
4.1.4. Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct a series of robustness checks. We first re-estimate
regression (28) by excluding imports from Hong Kong. We do this because a
large share of Chinese imports from Hong Kong are imported as transit trade.
Therefore, imports from Hong Kong do not reveal the import information of Hong
Kong. Including these observations could potentially bias our results. The results
excluding Hong Kong are reported in Column 1 of Table 6 and exhibit a similar
pattern as our basic results in Table 3. Therefore, our results are not driven by
the imports from Hong Kong.
Next, it might be the case that the import agglomeration in a particular city
is caused by some unobservable shocks. First, the city and source country specific
shocks might potentially cause firm-level import agglomeration. The shock affects
the economic relationships between a city and a source country, which in turn, leads
to the endogeneity of import spillovers. We control for this shock by introducing
a city-country-year fixed effect. Second, source specific shocks can also lead to
our results. Suppose there are productivity improvements in a given country. The
improvements lead to greater importing from this country. To control for this type
of shock, we add a country-year fixed effect. Third, the source and product specific
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shocks could potentially bias our results in Table 3. For instance, the quality of a
product in a particular country might change over time. As a result, the import
price and its change may partly reflect the evolution of product quality, which
could bias our estimates. Using a country-product-year fixed effect, we control for
this shock. The last shock we consider is a city and product specific shock. It
might be the case that different cities favor importing certain kinds of products
due to their own comparative advantage. We add a city-product-year fixed effect
to control for this type of heterogeneity. The results with above-mentioned fixed
effects are reported in column 2-6 of Table 6. It should be noted that including the
various above-mentioned fixed effects in a conditional Logit model is not possible.26
Instead, following Mayneris and Poncet (2015) we use a linear probability model
to estimate the firm-level import decision.
[Table 6 is to be here]
The results in Table 6 indicate that our baseline results are robust to different
shocks. That is after controlling different fixed effects, the likelihood a new im-
porter starts importing product k from a particular country j in year t is positively
related to the number of neighbors importing k from j in year t − 1, and nega-
tively related to the signal, average import price growth as revealed by neighbors
in market j. Furthermore, the entry decision depends on the signal more so if the
signal is revealed by more neighbors.
4.2. Initial Imports
4.2.1. The Impact of Signals on Firm-level Initial Imports
Proposition 2 predicts that conditional on entry, new importers’ initial imports
are decreasing in the strength of the signal revealed by neighbors, and more so if
26 When we attempt to control for different sets of fixed effects in a conditional Logit regression,
the large number of dummies bring computational burdens. Therefore, Mayneris and Poncet
(2015) suggest to use a linear probability model when controlling for various fixed effects.
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the signal is revealed by more neighbors. We estimate equation (28) but with the
entry dummy replaced by the firms’ (log) initial import quantities of k from j in
year t. All subscripts have the same meaning as before. The results are reported
in Table 7.
[Table 7 is to be here]
Columns (1) to (4) report the results by adding more controls in each column.
The results in Column (4) indicate that initial firm-level imports are increasing
in the number of neighboring importers, and decreasing in the signal only when
the signal is revealed by many nearby importers. This is slightly different from
the prediction in Proposition 2 in that the signal itself does affect initial firm-level
imports. There are several explanations for this finding. First, as we discussed
above, the signals some times are misleading, especially when they are revealed by
fewer neighboring importers. As such, a portion of new importers are attracted
to countries with a high import price but a revealed low expected price signal,
and these misleading firms import less than expected. These misguided firms tend
to obscure the effect of signals on initial firm-level imports. Second, firms often
strategically choose between flexible production scheme and non-flexible scheme
(see, Ro¨ller and Tombak, 1990; Vives, 1989). Intuitively, the more uncertainties a
firm faces, the more flexible production scheme the firm chooses.27 If a signal is
revealed by more neighbors, new importers face fewer uncertainties and will choose
a less flexible production scheme. In contrast, when a signal is revealed by fewer
neighbors, new importers will choose a more flexible production scheme. As such,
in the latter case firm-level initial imports do not rely on the signal as firms can
flexibly adjust their production level and import quantities.
27Vives (1989) has shown that more flexible production schemes are more costly. Firms only
choose these flexible production scheme if they face greater uncertainties.
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4.2.2. Different Type of Firms
In line with the section studying the decision to start importing, this section
explores the effect of signals on different type of firms. All the results are reported
in Table 8.
[Table 8 is to be here]
The results demonstrate that for different types of firms, the greater the number
of nearby importers, the larger the initial imports from the same destinations
the only exceptions are small firms and new entrants. This might be due to
their production capacity, which prevents the flexibility of adjusting their import
demand.
First, Column 1 and Column 2 show that relative to large firms, small firms’
initial imports are negatively affected by the signal when it is revealed by more
neighboring importers (the interaction term is not statistically significant for large
importers). The reason could be that large firms have better connections with
foreign suppliers or local importers, etc, and hence they do not rely on the signal
to help them determine how much to import.28 As such, their initial imports do
not rely on the signal.
Second, column 3 and column 4 compare the initial imports of heterogeneous
product importers and homogeneous product importers. The results imply that
while the initial imports for heterogeneous firms are affected by the signal when it
is revealed by more neighboring firms, the initial imports for homogeneous firm-
s do not depend on the signal. The intuition is that the price information for
homogeneous products is easy to obtain as these products are highly standard-
ized. Therefore, the signal revealed by nearby homogeneous product importers
does not add as much new information as that revealed by heterogeneous product
28According to Antras et al. (2014), large firms can afford the search cost. Therefore, another
possible interpretation might be that large firms conduct costly search before importing from
a particular country. As such, they do not rely on the signal but rely on their own search
information.
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importers.
Third, Column 5 and Column 6 report the results for new importers and switch-
ers. The new importers and switchers are defined in the same way as in section
which studies the decisions to start importing (section 4.1.3). Interestingly, more
nearby importers does not increase initial imports of new importers’ while it is
significantly increasing the initial imports of switchers. In addition, although the
signal has a negative impact on initial imports of both new importers and switch-
ers when it is revealed by more neighboring importers, the magnitude is much
smaller for new importers. One possible explanation for these differences is that
relative to switchers, the new importers might face more restrictive capacity or
distributional constraints. For instance, new importers may not have established
a sophisticated distributional network, and they cannot adjust their imports as
flexibly as switchers due to nontrivial distributional costs. On the one hand, the
neighboring importers cannot increase new importers’ initial imports. On the oth-
er hand, when a good signal is revealed by more nearby importers, it only increases
new importers’ initial imports in a smaller amount relative to those of switchers.
Last, we compare the response of firms with different ownership to the number
of neighboring importers and signals. The results are reported in column 7-9. The
results imply that an increase in the number of nearby importers will increase the
initial imports for all types of firms, and the signal affects different firms only when
its revealed by more nearby importers.
In sum, all of our results show that signal only play a role on initial firm-level
imports when it is revealed by more neighboring importers.
4.2.3. Robustness Checks
Similar to our analysis of the decision to start importing, we conduct a series of
regressions to check the results in Table 7 by dropping firms imports from Hong
Kong and controlling for different sets of fixed effects. The results are reported in
Table 9.
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[Table 9 is to be here]
Column 1 reports the results where we exclude firms which import from Hong
Kong. Column 2-5 report the results when control for city-country-year fixed
effects, city-year fixed effects, country-product-year fixed effects and city-product-
year fixed effects, respectively. All results demonstrate that initial firm-level im-
ports rely on signals only when they are revealed by more neighboring firms. All
results are consistent with the patterns reported in Table 7.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate how new importers learn from their neighbors. In con-
trast to export-learning from neighbors, when a firm makes its importing decision,
all markets are interdependent. The firm chooses to import each intermediate from
the most attractive country, in terms of import price. However, foreign markets
are associated with a high-level of uncertainty relative to the domestic market.
This feature encourages new importer to learn from their neighboring importers
in order to reduce the uncertainty in foreign markets.
We build an economic model to rationalize firm-level import-learning from
neighbors. New firms have prior beliefs about the prices in foreign markets. Their
entry and initial import decisions rely on their beliefs of the import prices. New
firms can update their prior beliefs by observing signals revealed by their neigh-
boring importers
The model predicts that an increase in the number of neighboring firms import-
ing product k from country j increases both the probability that new importers
start importing the same product from the same country, and increases their ini-
tial imports. In addition, a good signal revealed by neighboring importers also
encourages entry and increases initial imports. This effect is particularly strong
when the signal is revealed by a greater number of neighbors.
We find supporting evidence using firm-product transaction data from China.
First, we find that the probability that a new importer imports product k from
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country j in year t is increasing in the number of nearby firms importing the same
product from the same country in year t−1, and decreasing in the signal about the
market’s expected price inferred from neighbors’ import performance. The latter
effect is particularly strong if the signal is revealed by more neighbors. Second,
the results demonstrate that the initial firm-level imports are increasing in the
number of nearby firms importing the same product from the same country, and
decreasing in the signal only when the signal is revealed by more neighbors.
Our results highlight an important source of learning to import from neighbors.
The findings shed light on an under-explored benefit of agglomeration. Information
spillovers from neighboring importers could effectively reduce the uncertainty in
foreign markets. On average, the unit production cost of new importers decreases
after learning.
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Appendix (Figures and Tables)
Num. Neighbors (US) 2001 Num. Neighbors (US) 2006
Figure 1
The rate of entry into U.S. Market 2001 The rate of entry into U.S. Market 2006
Figure 2
39
Figure 3: log average export price from city c to country j between year t and t− 1
40
Table 1: Firm-Level Statistics on the Number of Imported Products per Source Country
and the Number of Source Countries per Imported Product
products per country countries per product The ratio of
firm-level firm-level imported product
mean median max mean median max from single country
2000-2006
mean 4.34 3.49 9.13 1.16 1.08 1.79
median 2.00 1.71 2.57 1.00 1.00 1.00 82.92%
95%tile 15.67 12.42 39.28 1.91 1.57 5.00
2000
mean 4.07 3.31 8.38 1.14 1.06 1.71
median 2.00 1.50 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 83.36%
95%tile 14.33 11.50 35 1.79 1.50 5.00
2001
mean 4.26 3.46 8.86 1.15 1.07 1.75
median 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 82.84%
95%tile 15.00 12.00 37.00 1.85 1.50 5.00
2002
mean 4.52 3.64 9.48 1.15 1.07 1.78
median 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 83.16%
95%tile 16.25 13.00 40.00 1.85 1.50 5.00
2003
mean 4.56 3.64 9.76 1.16 1.07 1.81
median 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 83.29%
95%tile 16.50 13.00 42.00 1.93 1.50 5.00
2004
mean 4.51 3.61 9.58 1.17 1.08 1.81
median 2.00 1.50 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 83.24%
95%tile 16.66 13.00 42.00 2.00 1.50 5.00
2005
mean 4.37 3.50 9.23 1.17 1.08 1.79
median 2.00 1.50 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 83.23%
95%tile 16.66 12.50 41.00 2.00 1.50 5.00
2006
mean 4.10 3.29 8.64 1.21 1.11 1.86
median 2.00 1.50 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 81.34%
95%tile 15.00 12.00 38.00 2.00 2.00 5.00
Note: All figures are based on the authors’ own calculations.
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Table 2: Firm-Level Statistics on the Number of Imported Products per Source Country
and the Number of Source Countries per Imported Product
Panel A: Provinces
Japan 6.43%
USA 3.46%
Germany 2.68%
Hong Kong 2.14%
Korea 1.97%
Panel B: Provinces
Guangdong 6.59%
Shanghai 6.18%
Jiangsu 2.51%
Beijing 1.92%
Liaoning 1.17%
Panel C: Sectors
Nuclear reactors, machinery et al. 4.24%
Electrical machinery et al 4.21%
Plastics and articles thereof 2.25%
Optical, photo, checking, precision 1.92%
Articles of iron or steel 1.31%
Notes: All figures are based on the authors’ own calculations.
Table 3: Import Entry and Learning from neighbors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(ncjk,t−1) 0.056*** 0.302*** 0.215*** 0.217***
(27.72) (51.23) (40.66) (41.16)
∆ln(pcjkt) -0.051*** -0.218*** -0.082*** -0.083***
(-5.68) (-22.56) (-5.37) (-5.42)
ln(ncjk,t−1)×∆ln(pcjkt) -0.087*** -0.086***
(-7.91) (-7.80)
GDP -0.373***
(-12.77)
Firm-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
product-country FE No No Yes Yes
# of obs 5,839,400 3,703,259 3,703,259 3,703,259
R2 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.012
Notes: Entryicjkt equals to 1 for the firm-city-country-product-year observation if firm i started
importing product k from j in year t. Entryicjkt is set to zero for all source countries from which
a new importer did not import k before t or in year t. The standard error is clustered at city level.
t-statistics are in parenthesis. *** , ** and * separately denote significance at the 99%, and 95%
and 90% levels.
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Table 4: Import Entry and Learning from neighbors-Different Specific Signals
All Product Same Product All Product
Same Country All Country All Country
(1) (2) (3)
ln(ncj(−k,t−1) 0.250***
(2.64)
∆ln(pcj(−k)t) 0.112
(0.84)
ln(ncj(−k),t−1)×∆ln(pcj(−k)t) -0.041
(-1.02)
ln(nc(−j)k,t−1) 0.336***
(8.91)
∆ln(pc(−j)kt) 0.067
(0.98)
ln(nc(−j)k,t−1)×∆ln(pc(−j)kt) -0.005
(-0.17)
ln(nc(−j)(−k),t−1) 0.246*
(1.88)
∆ln(pc(−j)(−k)t) -0.383
(-0.59)
ln(nc(−j)(−k),t−1)×∆ln(pc(−j)(−k)t) -0.041 -0.005 0.089
(-1.02) (-0.17) (0.57)
GDP -0.136 -0.217 -0.076
(-0.62) (-0.78) (-0.37)
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
product-country FE Yes yes Yes
# of obs 6,814,809 3,718,447 7,991,717
R2 0.007 0.011 0.008
Notes: Entryicjkt equals to 1 for the firm-city-country-product-year observation if firm i started
importing product k from j in year t. Entryicjkt is set to zero for all source countries that a new
importer did not import k before t or in year t. The standard error is clustered at city level. t-
statistics are in parenthesis. *** , ** and * separately denote significance at the 99%, and 95% and
90% levels.
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Table 7: Initial Import Volumes Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(ncjk,t−1) 0.027 0.025 0.026 0.074***
(0.96) (0.87) (0.92) (3.14)
∆ln(pcjkt) -0.335*** -0.319*** -0.035 -0.042
(-9.39) (-9.02) (0.68) (-0.85)
ln(ncjk,t−1)×∆ln(pcjkt) -0.263*** -0.224***
(-5.42) (-5.04)
GDP -0.146***
(-12.77)
Firm-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
product-country FE No No Yes Yes
# of obs 1,239,171 1,239,171 1,239,171 1,239,171
R2 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.08
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the city level. t-statistics are in parenthesis. *** ,
** and * separately denote significance at the 99%, and 95% and 90% levels.
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Table 9: Initial Import Volumes-Different Fixed Effects
Droping HK Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(ncjk,t−1) 0.125*** -0.031 0.048** 0.099*** 0.042***
(5.74) (-1.36) (2.02) (4.77) (2.81)
∆ln(pcjkt) -0.086* -0.009 -0.035 -0.089** -0.048
(-1.84) (-8.59) (-10.38) (-9.71) (-8.18)
ln(ncjk,t−1)×∆ln(pcjkt) -0.103*** -0.161*** -0.135*** -0.063* -0.144***
(-2.70) (-4.11) (-3.39) (-1.71) (-3.77)
GDP -0.144*** 0.231*** 0.077*** -0.035*** -0.087***
(-44.92) (30.73) (29.01) (-31.30) (-38.62)
Firm-Year FE Yes No No No No
Prod-Country FE Yes No No No No
Product FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-Country-Year FE No Yes No No No
Country-Year FE Yes No Yes No No
Country-Product-Year FE No No No Yes No
City-Product-Year FE No No No No Yes
# of obs 1,116,226 1,239,171 1,239,171 1,239,171 1,239,171
R2 0.09 0.198 0.141 0.360 0.361
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the city level. t-statistics are in parenthesis. *** , ** and * separately
denote significance at the 99%, and 95% and 90% levels.
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Appendix (Proof)
The updating process
Proof. Let plkj denote the price firm l pays for imports vk from country j. From
the perspective of firm i, the log price follows a normal distribution
f(ln plkj| lnωj) = 1√
2piV akj
exp
(
−(lnplkj − lnωkj)
2
2V akj
)
. (A1)
Therefore, the joint distribution of ln p1kj,...,ln pnkkj is
f(ln p1kj, .. ln pnkjkj| lnωj) =
[
1√
2piV akj
]nk
exp
(
−
∑l=nkj
l=1 (lnplkj − lnωj)2
2V akj
)
,
(A2)
The prior distribution of lnωj is
f(lnωj) =
1√
2piV ωkj
exp
(
−(lnωkj − µkj)
2
2V ωkj
)
(A3)
The posterior distribution of lnωj is given by the product of equation (A2) and
(A3):
f(lnωj| ln p1kj, .. ln pnkjkj) ∝ f(lnωj) · f(ln p1kj, .. ln pnkjkj| lnωj)
∝ exp
(
−
∑l=nkj
l=1 (ln plkj − lnωkj)2
2V akj
)
· exp
(
−(lnωkj − µkj)
2
2V ωkj
)
∝ exp
−
(
nkjV
ω
kj + V
a
kj
) [
lnωkj − nkjV
ω
kj ln pkj+V
a
kjukj
nkjV
ω
kj+V
a
kj
]2
2V akjV
ω
kj
 , (A4)
where ln pkj =
1
nkj
∑l=nkj
l=1 ln plkj. From equation (11) the updated posterior mean
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and variance of lnωj is
µ′kj =
nkjV
ω
kjln pkj + V
a
kjukj
nkjV ωkj + V
a
kj
V ωkj
′ =
V akjV
ω
kj
nkjV ωkj + V
a
kj
=
(
1
V ωkj
+
nkj
V akj
)−1
(A5)
Proof. Inequality (19)
∂Pikj
∂µnbkj,t−1
=
e
(
−µpostkjt −
V
post
kj
2
−ln τjt−lnvij
)∑
r 6=j e
(
−µpostkrt −
V
post
krt
2
−lnτrt−lnvir
) (
− nkj,t−1V
ω
kj
nkjV
ω
kj+V
a
kj
)
∑r=J
r=0 e
(
−µpostkrt −
V
post
krt
2
−lnτrt−lnvir
)2
< 0.
(A6)
Proof. Inequality (20)
∂Pikj
∂nkj,t−1
=
e
(
−µpostkjt −
V
post
kjt
2
−ln τjt−lnvij
)∑
r 6=j e
(
−µpostkrt −
V
post
krt
2
−lnτrt−lnvir
)
∑r=J
r=0 e
(
−µpostkrt −
V
post
krt
2
−lnτrt−lnvir
)2
(
− ∂µ
post
kjt
∂nkj,t−1
− 1
2
∂V
post
kjt
∂nkj,t−1
)
(A7)
where
∂µpostkjt
∂nkj,t−1
=
V ωkjV
a
kj
(
µnbkj,t−1−µkj
)(
nkjV ωkj + V
a
kj
)2 < 0 if ln pkj < µkj (A8)
∂V
post
kjt
∂nkj,t−1
=
−V ωkjV akj
(
V ωkj + V
a
kj
)(
nkj,t−1V ωkj + V
a
kj
)2 < 0 (A9)
Inequality (A8) and (A9) imply that if ln pkj−µkj < 0, ∂Pikj∂nkj,t−1 < 0
Proof: the initial firm-level imports are decreasing in the expected
price of k in market j:
∂impkj
∂(τjEpikj)
< 0
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Proof.
impikt =
ECtskj
τjEpikj
= (σ − 1)Bϕσ−1 [(χ+ (τjEpikj))1−ρ] ρ−σ1−ρ (τjEpikj)−ρ
[χ+ (τjEpikj)1−ρ]
where χ =
∑
r 6=k(τj(r)Epirj(r))
1−ρ.
∂impikt
∂(τjEpikj)
= (σ − 1)Bϕσ−1(τjpikj)−ρ−1
[
χ+ (τjpikj)
1−ρ] ρ−σ1−ρ−1 [−ρχ− σ(τjEpikj)1−σ] < 0
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